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Chengping Zhang
MoraL LuCk in ThoMas hardy’s FiCTion
Thomas hardy is notorious for persecuting his characters merci-lessly with coincidences and untimely chance and luck. i suggest 
that this idiosyncrasy is his exploration of the problem of “moral luck” 
to confront the reader with such fundamental ethical questions as how 
to make moral judgments and attribute moral responsibility. 
Making moral judgments is an essential part in our life, and our 
moral thoughts and beliefs invariably find expression mainly in the 
form of judgments. When we make moral judgments we are applying 
moral concepts to ourselves and others to make sense of our lives, to 
provide a common ground for interpersonal moral communication and 
to enable our moral growth. Making such judgments is also an exercise 
of moral confidence: whether we are consistent about our moral belief, 
whether we are confident enough to voice our attitudes, and whether 
we are courageous enough to be responsible for our judgment. This 
practice has been so internalized into our psychology that it becomes 
almost part of us—a demonstration of our existence as moral beings.
yet such confidence can meet serious setbacks, especially when we 
find that an agent cannot be totally responsible for the result of her 
action. For example, how should we judge agamemnon’s decision to 
sacrifice his daughter so that the Greek fleet can set out for war? Can 
we accept seth’s self-justification for cutting her daughter’s throat with 
a handsaw or should we condemn her violent motherly love in Toni 
Morrison’s Beloved? Would anna karenina’s decision to elope with 
Vronsky have been justifiable if it had resulted in their living a happy 
life together? These difficult situations directly challenge our moral 
concepts and beliefs and force us to admit our moral uncertainty and 
self-conceit: do we really believe in what we declare? are those values 
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we hold dear always commensurable? do we really think that good will 
is unconditionally good in any situation? 
We find difficulties in such boundary situations because these agents 
are invariably affected by an alien and unexpected link in the chain of 
life: untimely chance and luck. By chance they either run into a moral 
dilemma or their actions turn out badly, but this cannot prevent them 
from being judged by us—the problem is, should we judge them by 
their intention and ignore the harm their actions bring? or should 
we thus accuse them of being morally deficient or invalid because of 
something they cannot control? When we ask such questions we are 
also questioning the kantian belief that an agent should be judged only 
by what she wills and that good or bad luck should not influence our 
moral assessment of her—which assumes morality is free from external 
contingency, and any rational agent can have full control of her will 
and choice and therefore should bear complete responsibility for her 
action. yet we obviously feel that luck has penetrated the sanctuary of 
morality and leaves footprints on our moral existence as it does any-
where else in our lives. 
This challenge to the traditional kantian criterion of moral judgment 
was first raised by Bernard Williams and Thomas nagel in two articles 
with the same title “Moral Luck” in 1976, arguing that luck does influ-
ence an agent’s self-assessment (which is Williams’s main concern) and 
people’s moral judgment as well (which is nagel’s focus). according to 
nagel, where “a significant aspect of what someone does depends on 
factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect 
as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck.”1 he further 
divides moral luck into four kinds: constitutive luck, which determines 
one’s inclinations, capacities and temperament; circumstantial luck, 
which determines the kind of problems and situations one faces; ante-
cedent luck, which determines one’s choice and actions by antecedent 
circumstances; and resultant luck, which refers to the way one’s actions 
and projects turn out. Each kind, though beyond the agent’s control, will 
influence her will or choice and ultimately the result of action (nagel, 
p. 28). The sanctuary turns out to have a back door through which luck 
slips in: if morality is not immune to luck, then moral risk is inevitable 
for an agent while making decisions and taking action. 
Ever since then moral philosophers have been trying to prove or 
deny the existence of moral luck or to solve the problem it raises in our 
moral practice. Martha nussbaum encourages us to see it positively as 
an indispensable part of the human condition which make a good and 
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fruitful life.2 nafsika athanassoulis brings evidence to show that kant’s 
attitude toward luck is not absolute, that kant distinguishes two human 
characters—an “intelligible” self and a “sensible” self—and admits that 
the “sensible” self can be influenced by empirical contingencies. That 
is why kant emphasizes the importance of education, good teachers 
and role models.3 There are also arguments admitting that moral luck 
does exist yet unwilling to yield to the problems it brings. Brian rose-
bury, for instance, argues that the notion of moral luck is based on a 
misunderstanding of terms (e.g. moral assessment/judgment, lack of 
control, responsibility, justification), therefore if we make clear what the 
key terms mean and apply them strictly, no problem would arise.4 
such arguments seem to miss the point Williams and nagel aim 
at—for they are talking about our inconsistency in theory and practice, 
that we may hold the kantian belief yet act differently, that the results 
do influence our moral assessment of the agent. Moreover, we are 
associating an agent’s moral character with her behavior and judging 
not only her behavior but herself; and she must be morally responsible 
for the result of her action, a result which can be influenced or even 
determined by good or bad luck. nagel makes this point clear enough: 
“We may be persuaded that these moral judgments are irrational, but 
they reappear involuntarily as soon as the argument is over. This is the 
pattern throughout the subject” (p. 33). 
is there a solution to the problem of moral luck? To redefine the 
term or certain key words and restrict their use is simply dodging the 
problem; to argue that we should be aware of human fallibility and 
epistemic limitation, that we should acquire more information about 
the particular case so as to make the best and soundest judgment we 
can manage, that we should modify our attitude and abandon hostility 
toward the agent and base our judgment only on her action instead of 
her whole being means moral luck will remain a problem before we 
change old practice. and chances are that it will remain a problem. still 
it is illuminating to realize how moral luck once again calls our attention 
to those fundamental ethical questions—what it is to be human and to 
be a moral being; and to realize that the human condition contains two 
irreconcilable sides yet we are constantly struggling to reconcile them 
as best as we can.
nicholas rescher comments that most cases of moral luck discussed 
in the debate are too extreme to be of much relevance to our everyday 
life. since ordinarily our moral evaluation does reflect “the ordinary 
course of things,” we should not forsake moral appraisals which are 
“standardized” rules to help us make common sense judgments about 
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“the situation of the ordinary common run of things.”5 This argument 
is sound enough, but extreme cases do exist and may not be as uncom-
mon as rescher declares. To neglect extreme cases is to risk falling into 
complacency, narrow-mindedness, and moral rigidity.
one realm above all others which abounds in extreme cases is 
fictional narrative, in which we are provided a better opportunity to 
avoid epistemic limitation, or external contingency, or the pressure for 
instant response, and hence we are also allowed a better opportunity to 
practice (in both senses) the most reasonable, objective and humane 
moral judgment. This is also one important reason why we read liter-
ary narrative. 
Making judgments while reading a fictional narrative, however, is quite 
different from our daily practice: we are facing a more complicated 
structure. in The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction Wayne Booth dif-
ferentiates three voices in a text—the narrator, the implied author and 
the writer—and suggests that an ethical reading of the text will disclose 
the relationship between the reader and the implied author.6 Based on 
this model we can identify at least three dimensions of moral judgment 
in the narrative. 
The first is the characters’ self-judgment and the judgment from other 
characters, from the community and society, which may be called “the 
direct judgment” because it will influence the characters’ lives directly. 
The second dimension is the narrator’s judgment on the characters, 
which exists throughout a fiction either diagetically through authorial 
comment, advice and moral admonition (as in the more conventional 
type of novel), or in a less straightforward way through the narrator’s 
deliberate choice of form and style to present the plot, characters and 
actions. The narrator’s point of view is nevertheless subjective: he narrates 
what he deems important and proper, and these are judgments closely 
related to his moral principles and views. above the previous two types 
is the implied author’s judgment, which is, namely, “implied.” it shows 
the values the text is intent on conveying, and is fully clear to the reader 
only when she finishes reading and grasps the work as a whole. 
When the three levels of moral assessment are identical, the reader 
will easily recognize the embedded ethical code in the story (even if 
she may disapprove it). in this case, the narrator can be regarded as a 
reliable and faithful agent of the implied author. if there lies contra-
diction between the direct judgment and the narrator’s judgment, or 
if the narrator strikes the reader as unreliable, then she may remain 
dubious and has to undergo further exploration before pinning down 
the implied author’s judgment and readjusts her own accordingly. 
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it is interesting to note that different works written by the same author 
may demand that the reader make moral judgments differently—such 
as Thomas hardy’s novels, in which cases of moral luck abound. his 
frequent recourse to coincidence and accident, sometimes reproached 
on the ground of verisimilitude, proves especially interesting to the ethi-
cal reader. This essay will take his Far from the Madding Crowd (1874) and 
The Return of the Native (1878) as examples to test how cases of moral 
luck work differently in the two novels.7 
The first case in Madding Crowd is the Valentine card Bathsheba sends 
to Boldwood with a seal “Marry Me” on it in Chapter Xiii. This is a case 
of resultant luck for Bathsheba and circumstantial luck for Boldwood. 
When sending the card Bathsheba does not expect that it will ignite 
the excessive passion buried in the solemn and reserved Boldwood and 
later throw him into mental disorder which leads to his shooting Troy. 
To her it is just a “childish game of an idle minute” (FMC, p. 158), yet 
it develops in such an unexpected direction that she has to take serious 
moral responsibility for her recklessness and whimsy. as she implores 
Boldwood’s forgiveness and accuses herself as “wanton” (p. 101), 
“thoughtless, inexcusable, wicked” (p. 270), she is experiencing what 
Bernard Williams calls “agent-regret,” which is a regret toward her own 
past action which involves her voluntary agency however unintention-
ally that might be.8 This uncontrollable bad luck not only influences 
Bathsheba’s self-judgment, but also other characters’ judgment of her: 
as the victim of her action, Boldwood accuses her of being “heartless” 
(p. 159); as an onlooker, Gabriel oak blames her with devastating can-
dour and judges her trick as “unworthy of any thoughtful, and meek, 
and comely woman” (p. 105). 
Meanwhile, this case is one of circumstantial luck for Boldwood. had 
he not received the card from Bathsheba, he might have remained 
unconscious of his extreme personality; yet bad luck subjects him to 
this test and he obviously fails it. his obsession becomes a haunting 
nightmare to Bathsheba: he takes advantage of her sense of guilt, stub-
bornly refuses to forgive her and persistently presses her to accept him, 
totally disregarding her obvious unwillingness and her frank claim that 
she does not love him. his attempt to bribe Troy to marry Fanny and 
give up Bathsheba is not only ridiculous but dishonorable. although this 
situational luck does not entail negative moral judgment on Boldwood 
by himself or other characters (except oak), the narrator’s comments 
clearly invite the reader both to pity him and to blame him. 
The second case is Fanny’s going to the wrong church for her wedding 
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with Troy in Chapter XVi. This is a case of circumstantial luck for Troy. 
if Fanny had arrived on time they would have married no matter how 
unenthusiastic Troy is; then he would not be blamed for seducing and 
deserting Fanny, and he would not blame himself and feel deep remorse 
later when Fanny dies giving birth to their child. of course if this hap-
pened the plot of the novel would have to take a different course; still 
it does render Troy blameworthy for his ill-treatment of Fanny. 
although moral judgment remains an urgent need in Madding Crowd, 
it never becomes controversial. We do not feel particularly indignant 
or troubled that Bathsheba, Boldwood and Troy have to assume more 
severe moral responsibility than they otherwise would. These cases do 
arouse tensions, anxiety and pathos; yet we can always rely on the narra-
tor’s guidance as well as on the moral compass of the male protagonist, 
the upright and trustworthy oak. When the last page of the novel is 
turned, we may be glad that things end as we expected although we 
feel sorry for the sufferings the protagonists have undergone. We may 
even feel that the two cases are dramatized to accentuate the contrast 
between virtue and vice and to aggravate the consequence caused by 
moral defects.
Thus moral luck in Madding Crowd is adopted not only as a literary 
strategy to complicate the plot and to arouse tension and suspense, but 
also as a moral strategy to testify to the existence of a moral universe 
and the final triumph of the good and the faithful. This also assures 
the reader that luck cannot harm the truly virtuous agent and allows 
the reader enough confidence in making the right judgment. 
yet when we move into another two cases of moral luck in Return, 
we will find the situation more complicated. The first case is Clym’s 
semi-blindness due to his ceaseless night reading. at first glance, this 
has nothing to do with moral luck although it is bad luck. it does not 
harm the public opinion of his morality but wins him pity and sympathy 
from the community instead. however, this accidental affliction does 
influence Eustacia’s judgment on his moral integrity. in a moment of 
anguish Eustacia accuses him directly: “your blunders and misfortunes 
may have been a sorrow to you, but they have been a wrong to me. . . . 
you deceived me” (RN, p. 256). her accusation is not unreasonable 
because the accident does leave Clym unable to justify his hasty decision 
to marry Eustacia. 
Then we find that Clym is not only subjected to Eustacia’s judgment 
but also to the narrator’s: the narrator provides abundant evidence to 
prove that Clym is culpable for his decision. Clym’s motive in marrying 
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Eustacia, besides sexual attraction, is to make her a helpmate in his 
school project, yet she has explicitly expressed her lack of interest in 
teaching. Moreover, even when Clym is proposing to Eustacia he is clearly 
conscious that “she loved him rather as a visitant from a gay world to 
which she rightly belonged than as a man with a purpose opposed to 
that recent past of his which so interested her” (p. 158). he also knows 
that she is willing to marry him only in the belief that he will abandon 
his project and return to Paris, yet he chooses to keep silent about it. 
By exposing these traces unknown to other characters, the narrator puts 
Clym into the scope of moral judgment and indicates that the reader 
should think twice when attributing responsibility.
The second case is the “closed door” which leads to Mrs. yeobright’s 
lonely death on the heath and the breach of Eustacia and Clym’s mar-
riage. Certainly Eustacia is not blameless—she does not open the door 
immediately when Mrs. yeobright knocks, and she fails to tell Clym 
about his mother’s visit after he wakes up. yet again the narrator con-
vinces the reader that this is Eustacia’s moral bad luck: there is much 
highly contrived antecedent luck—that the two women once quarreled 
because Mrs. yeobright suspected Eustacia’s relationship with Wildeve; 
and circumstantial luck—that Wildeve and Mrs. yeobright choose to pay 
a visit on the same day; that Clym happens to fall asleep before both of 
them arrive; that he happens to call out “mother” in his dream so that 
Eustacia believes he is awakened and will open the door himself; that the 
heart-broken Mrs. yeobright happens to be bitten by an adder on her 
weary way back. if any of these incidents did not occur, tragedy would 
not strike; but without inquiring an explanation Clym claims Eustacia 
an inhuman and treacherous murderess and even denies all the good-
ness in her: “how bewitched i was! how could there be any good in a 
woman that everybody spoke ill of” (p. 256). not until Eustacia’s death 
does Clym realize his limitation on making moral judgments. Thus the 
direct judgment is undermined by the narrator’s strong diagetic and 
mimetic counter-argument. 
Contrary to the case in Madding Crowd, Return appears to provide 
the reader no comfort, no security and no solution to the moral dif-
ficulties the narrative raises. The narrator’s judgment remains ambigu-
ous throughout the novel. he has to give the main characters a moral 
position, but he refuses to make that position fixed. This indecisiveness 
in effect mars the characterization: Leonard W. deen points to the 
incongruities between the tragic and mythological weight the narrator 
loads on Eustacia and her intellectual limitation and mundane aspira-
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tions and considers hardy’s attempt as “self-defeating.”9 dale kramer 
suggests that this flaw is due to hardy’s inexperience in appropriating 
the genre of tragedy into narrative form.10 
yet this incongruity can be accounted for differently, in terms of the 
narrator’s eager participation in the moral debate to counter-balance that 
hasty and irrational judgment the public levels at Eustacia. he therefore 
spares no effort to highlight the intrinsic value she possesses—her vital-
ity, passion, beauty, and aspiration for higher aims and self-fulfillment. 
These qualities are good in themselves; yet chance and luck leave them 
unfulfilled, dissatisfied and defeated. By granting Eustacia grandeur and 
nobility the narrator may succeed in winning the reader’s sympathy and 
appreciation for Eustacia, but he fails to provide a satisfactory answer 
to the problem of moral judgment. When the reader realizes the nar-
rator’s shortcomings and unreliability, she has to pause and ask: how 
to make the right judgment? 
With this consciousness the reader approaches the implied author’s 
judgment. By revealing the limitations of both the direct judgment 
and the narrator’s judgment, the implied author entreats the reader 
to hesitate before making any acceptable judgment. This “hesitation of 
judgment” is not an indefinite deferral or withdrawal of judgment, but 
a warning not to rush to judgment, when circumstances of luck may 
lurk around and influence the result of an agent’s action, which may 
be beyond our knowledge. Moral luck, the initiator of “poetic justice” 
in Madding Crowd, transforms unexpectedly into a rebel in Return. it 
challenges the confidence the reader has acquired from reading Mad-
ding Crowd and reminds the reader how problematic and dangerous a 
hasty moral judgment can be: good will can yield suffering, whereas 
insensibility to moral luck and its grave influence can lead to injustice. 
These are life’s little ironies we have to live with, and our response to 
them demonstrates our moral status and subjects us to moral assess-
ment in turn. 
after the moment of hesitation, we may view the characters and the 
novel more clearly: selfish and willful as she is, Eustacia is admirable 
for her dignity and perseverance; Clym is naïve and obstinate, but his 
love of humanity and courage in self-sacrifice is sincere and sublime. 
When we come to perceive the novel’s complicated dimensions of moral 
judgment and its morally deficient characters, we are likely to feel that 
they deserve better. This is not an appeal to a transcendental deity but 
to the reader and humanity at large—that when we face the grind of 
stern reality, compassion and love is all we can offer to prevent inflicting 
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further pain on our fellowmen. Clym’s plan to spread the Positivist ethi-
cal values to Egdon heath and to teach his people to bear the misery of 
life fails; yet surprisingly enough, his goal is partly achieved by a story 
telling about his failure—a rich and artistic type of ethics. 
one reason why cases of moral luck give readers different experiences 
in the two novels lies in the narrative strategies. although both novels 
have a third-person omniscient narrator, they strike the reader as possess-
ing very different personality and moral outlook. The narrator in Mad-
ding Crowd is easy-going, humorous, entertaining and morally confident, 
while the narrator in Return is somber, gloomy, dissatisfied, meditative 
and morally skeptical. They also take different moral stances in judging 
their characters: the reader will find in retrospect that Bathsheba and 
Eustacia share a lot in common—both are vain, haughty, flirtatious, 
rebellious, intelligent and stubbornly courageous—but the narrator in 
Madding Crowd constantly reminds the reader how Bathsheba’s impulsive 
nature brings about her suffering, while the narrator in Return constantly 
reminds the reader how Eustacia’s passion and vitality might make her 
a greater being than she actually is.11
The difference in narrative strategy demonstrates a difference in genre: 
Madding Crowd is a melodrama and Return a hybrid of melodrama and 
tragedy. Michael Millgate frequently comments on the “melodramatic 
devices” in Madding Crowd and describes it as “melodramatic romanti-
cism.”12 Melodrama was a highly sentimental mode of representation 
popular in early and mid-Victorian era, and large quantities of poor 
quality theatre characterized by bad acting brought this genre a bad 
reputation. nevertheless modern scholars have tried to broaden and 
rehabilitate it: Peter Brooks adopts the term to describe an aesthetic 
form and a mode of representation working both in the realm of the-
atre and the novel;13 robert heilman has rediscovered melodrama’s 
psychological function in allowing the reader the pleasures of self-pity 
and the experience of wholeness brought by an identification with 
“monopathy,” a “singleness of feeling.”14 
in a melodrama chance and luck is frequently employed to dramatize 
and heighten the intense conflict between cosmic ethical forces, with the 
purpose of testifying to the existence of a moral universe. Brooks asserts 
that in a melodrama we find “a world where what one lives for and by 
is seen in terms of, and is determined by, the most fundamental psychic 
relations and cosmic ethical forces.”15 it highlights the stark ethical 
conflicts in human life: a protagonist fights against external forces and 
either wins or loses. if he wins he is awarded what his virtue deserves; 
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if he loses he is battered by fate and chance. as in Madding Crowd, oak 
is rewarded with Bathsheba and property for his moral righteousness 
and his loyalty to love. 
This insight helps us to view hardy’s frequent use of coincidences, 
untimely chance and luck from a new perspective. hardy was often 
accused by his contemporaries of violating the principles of verisimili-
tude, which he does not deny; but he justifies this strategy as being true 
to art: “art is a disproportioning—(i.e., distorting, throwing out of 
proportion)—of realities, to show more clearly the features that mat-
ter in those realities, which, if merely copied or reported inventorially, 
might possibly be observed, but would more probably be overlooked.”16 
if we view this strategy as related to the technique of melodrama, we 
can discern how hardy is pressing extreme conflicts, distorting reali-
ties to accentuate the essentials of life through “a bold reinvention of 
ethics.”17
Melodramatic elements are present in almost every hardy novel and 
short story, and his narrators habitually conclude the narrative by alluding 
to chance and luck; yet what makes Return a hybrid of melodrama and 
tragedy is the narrator’s ambiguous moral status and the absence of a 
moral universe. There is no cosmic moral order; moral luck no longer 
leads to poetic justice as it did in Madding Crowd. The reader finds the 
narrator as well as the characters struggling between different values 
and imperatives: the narrator admires human compassion and self-
sacrifice, but cannot neglect that the so-called self-sacrifice unavoidably 
implicates cost to others; he cherishes human passion and spontaneity, 
but cannot ignore that such emotions essential for a flourishing life can 
be destructive and ruinous to life in a civilized world. he cannot help 
questioning the bases of our sense of superior moral integrity when we 
make moral judgments.
it seems clear that hardy’s shift of genre from melodrama to tragedy 
was conducted deliberately. on 18 February 1874 hardy wrote to Les-
lie stephen in reply to stephen’s suggestion for deletions to Madding 
Crowd: “The truth is that i am willing, and indeed anxious, to give up 
any points which may be desirable in a story when read as a whole, for 
the sake of others which shall please those who read it in numbers. 
Perhaps i may have higher aims some day, and be a great stickler for 
the proper artistic balance of the completed work, but for the present 
circumstances lead me to wish merely to be considered a good hand 
at a serial” (LW, p. 102). This reveals how hardy views Madding Crowd 
himself—an interesting pastoral story with no higher aims than serial 
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publication. Return, however, is quite different: Michael Millgate confirms 
that when writing Return hardy “had striven more deliberately than ever 
before to make the book an unmistakable work of art”;18 T. r. Wright 
claims that Return is “probably hardy’s most ambitious book, the most 
difficult and demanding for readers”;19 while John Paterson provides 
convincing evidence to show that for this novel hardy had in mind “a 
formal and structural analogy with Greek tragedy.”20
Thus in hardy’s earlier novels moral luck tends to dramatize conflicts 
between different characters and forces and between virtue and vice. 
in Return and most of his later novels hardy gradually turned to those 
key issues confronting a newly expanded industrialized and urbanized 
society. The life of the individual in the family, in courtship, and in mar-
riage is related to larger historical, social, political, or spiritual themes; 
different dimensions of moral judgment also emerge as more and more 
distinctly conflicting. Moral luck becomes a problematic element which 
renders good will into dangerous results, or public prejudice into unfair 
persecution. This rough division, turning on Return, can help us under-
stand why in his early novels moral luck often works for the worse of the 
“villains” or morally-flawed characters but rarely harms the integrity of 
the moral heroes, and why situations grow more intricate in later works 
and nobody can be exempt from moral bad luck. 
With different aims in mind, Madding Crowd and Return provide the 
reader different aesthetic as well as ethical experiences. Madding Crowd 
encourages our belief in the existence of a moral universe and fosters 
our confidence in making the right moral judgment; while Return denies 
this belief and shows our moral deficiency and suggests human compas-
sion and a hesitation of moral judgment as an urgent necessity for our 
moral existence. But should we thus conclude that Return is superior 
to Madding Crowd? i certainly reject this reduction.
First, Madding Crowd is an excellent melodrama while Return is an 
incomplete tragedy. Madding Crowd achieves a good balance in char-
acterization, plotting and actions while the confusing characterization 
does make Return less successful—the two protagonists are overloaded 
by the heroic, mythical and tragic weight the narrator grants them. 
There seems to be a gap between what hardy wants them to be and 
what they really are, since neither their words nor deeds can evoke the 
grandeur hardy intends the reader to feel. The mythical and classical 
allusions and aestheticization hence seem to be incongruous, and the 
goal is yet to find a more satisfactory expression. 
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second, as heilman argues, “Men not only write tragedy and melo-
drama but also, in quite nonliterary contexts, view human experience 
tragically or melodramatically.”21 Both melodrama and tragedy are 
perspectives on life and both are indispensable for a firm grasp of 
human experiences and an accurate representation of what life feels 
like. Melodrama heightens our conflicts with external contingency and 
resolves these conflicts with extreme solutions so as to satisfy our wish 
to find model solutions to the problems in real life. Tragedy reminds 
us of the destructive agonies of inner dividedness and the antagoniz-
ing values and imperatives in human life. Melodrama gives us release, 
tragedy gives us catharsis.
Finally, the codes of moral judgment conveyed by melodrama and trag-
edy are both necessary for our moral practice. Melodrama encourages 
us to make moral judgments and identify with the virtuous characters, 
whereas tragedy tells us any moral judgment can be fallible and risky. 
This is exactly the relations we see between morality and ethics—ethics 
inquires how one should live, whereas morality asks what one should do. 
Tragedy warns of the danger of moral judgment and urges hesitation, 
whereas melodrama understands the necessity to make moral judg-
ment and invites confidence. Confidence or hesitation—each manifests 
our outlook on life. yet it is not a matter of “either/or” but a “both.” 
Embracing both versions of experience will help us fathom the nature 
of moral luck and moral judgment, satisfy our need for an applicable 
moral existence and an ideal ethical existence, and reshape our ethical 
perspective and enrich our ethical experience.
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